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This paper describes how limited liability leads to risk-loving behaviour in nuclear power companies 
and unsafe nuclear power plants. By reviewing current regulatory regimes, we show that this issue is 
not being sufficiently addressed today. Therefore, we evaluate five regulatory instruments: (1) safety 
regulation, (2) minimum equity requirements, (3) mandatory insurance, (4) risk-sharing pools, and (5) 
catastrophe bonds. We conclude that none of these instruments in its pure form can be recommended. 
Thus, we propose a new approach that, in its core, consists of a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, 
capital markets assess the risk stemming from each nuclear power plant via catastrophe bonds. In the 
second step, the regulator uses this private risk assessment and intervenes by charging an actuarially 
fair premium in the form of a Pigouvian risk fee. Society ultimately acts as an explicit insurer for 
nuclear risk and is, on average, fairly compensated for the risk it is taking over. 
Keywords 




Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima are terrifying events in the history of civilian nuclear 
power use, which goes back to the 1950s. The probability of a severe accident occurring at a nuclear 
power plant on a randomly chosen day is microscopically small, yet, many people are afraid of this 
risk. Nuclear power is still being used after those catastrophes because energy is essential for the 
functioning of modern societies and a way to generate a continuous supply of energy using other 
climate-friendly technologies at reasonable costs has not yet been found. It is important, however, that, 
if and as long as a society decides to use nuclear power, its risk be properly taken care of. 
The Energy Roadmap 2050, published by the European Commission (EC) in December 2011, 
emphasises the current and future role of nuclear energy as an ‘important part of Europe’s power 
generation mix’ and considers it to be ‘needed to provide a significant contribution in the energy 
transformation process’ (see EC, 2011). Thus, despite a general reassessment of nuclear risk after the 
Fukushima catastrophe, nuclear power is likely to remain a significant determinant of many European 
countries’ electricity supply. On the downside, the Fukushima accident, with estimated costs of up to 
USD 250 billion (cf. JCER, 2011), has shown how strongly a society can be affected by the use of 
nuclear power while also sensitising people to the reality that many nuclear power plants may be 
carrying a substantial risk. 
We argue in this paper that the problem at heart is the existence of de facto (through the amount of 
equity capital) or de jure (by law) limited liability for nuclear power companies (NPCs). The basic 
mechanism is the fact that an NPC cannot lose more than the legally defined liability capital or, in the 
worst case, its equity capital, even if the damage of a nuclear accident is much higher. This may 
reduce the incentive to invest in costly nuclear safety and lead to an inefficient safety level in nuclear 
power plants. For example, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) reported equity capital in 
the amount of JPY 2.6 trillion (about USD 19 billion) for 2011 (see TEPCO, 2011). This does not 
seem small at first glance; however, this amount does not even constitute ten per cent of the estimated 
costs of the Fukushima catastrophe, the rest of which cannot be borne by TEPCO and must therefore 
eventually be absorbed by Japanese society in a way yet to be specified. Similarly, the liability of 
other NPCs around the world is limited de jure or de facto (see Tab. 1 for a brief overview and Section 
3 for a more detailed discussion). 
Tab. 1: De facto vs. de jure limited liability, selected countries/NPCs 
Selection of countries with de jure limited 
liabilitya 
Countries with de facto limited liabilityb 
China RMB 300 million 
Germany 
E.ON EUR 39.6 billion 
Czech Republic CZK 8 billion RWE EUR 9.9 billion 
France EUR 91 million EnBW EUR 6.4 billion 
India INR 5 billion Vattenfall SEK 138.9 billion 
United Kingdom GBP 140 million Japan TEPCO JPY 2.6 trillion 
United States USD 375 million Switzerland Alpiq CHF 7.8 billion 
 
a right column: de jure national liability limitation; b right column: NPCs’ equity capital in 2011 
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One of the original goals of nuclear power liability regulation was and still is to protect NPCs against 
potentially ruinous claims by setting a limit to their liability. In this way, regulators increased the 
profitability of the industry and contributed to its development. Currently, the countries using nuclear 
power can be broken down into two groups. The first group of countries – Germany, Japan, and 
Switzerland – do not limit the NPCs’ liability by law; NPCs can, at most, be made liable with their 
equity capital. The second group, comprising all other countries, impose strong de jure liability 
limitations. 
A body of literature has analysed how limited liability affects individuals’ decision making, finding 
that it induces a distortion towards risk-loving behaviour (see, for example, Sinn, 1983; Shavell, 
1986). The literature on NPCs’ risk choice similarly emphasises that it might be too excessive owing 
to limited liability (see Tyran and Zweifel, 1993; Strand, 1994; Trebilcock and Winter, 1997; van’t 
Veld and Hutchinson, 2009, who also provide a review of other related literature). Further literature 
discusses both conventional and innovative remedies for overcoming this problem (see, for example, 
Tyran and Zweifel, 1993; Trebilcock and Winter, 1997; Radetzki and Radetzki, 2000; Faure, 2004; 
Cummins and Weiss, 2009). Particularly closely related to our work are Tyran and Zweifel (1993) and 
Radetzki and Radetzki (2000), who elaborate on the possibility of using capital markets to deal with 
limited liability and cover the potential damages from nuclear accidents. 
We contribute to this literature in three ways: First, we provide a strong argument on how limited 
liability affects the risk-taking behaviour of NPCs and illustrate it by reviewing current regulation, 
showing that this is not a theoretical nature but a real one. Second, we consider various regulatory 
instruments and evaluate their ability to set the desired incentives such that NPCs choose the optimal 
level of risk. We conclude that none of them in its pure form can be recommended. Third, we propose 
a new approach superior to other instruments. The core of our proposal consists of a two-stage 
approach, in the first of which capital markets evaluate the risk stemming from each power plant via 
catastrophe bonds; in the second step, the regulator uses this private risk assessment and intervenes by 
charging an actuarially fair premium, thereby inducing the optimal level of risk-taking. Society then 
acts as an explicit insurer for nuclear risk but is, on average, fairly compensated. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we outline an aspect of the theory 
of limited liability that is important for our argument and define the negative externality stemming 
from excessive risk-taking. In Section 3, nuclear power liability regulation around the world is briefly 
summarised, serving as a framework within which to evaluate several regulatory instruments on their 
ability to internalise excessive risk-taking in the nuclear industry in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
elaborate a new regulatory proposal, a market-based nuclear risk fee. We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Limited liability and risk-taking of an NPC 
This section develops a theoretical argument about how the limited liability of NPCs affects their risk-
taking behaviour. According to Sinn (1982, 1983), the existence of limited liability generates a kink in 
a firm’s or individual’s utility function, as all losses beyond the factual or legal liability are truncated 
and thus not taken care of. This also applies to NPCs, which are liable, at most, with their equity 
capital. As nuclear catastrophes imply extremely large economic losses and as the equity capital of 
NPCs is comparatively tiny (see Tab. 1), the nuclear industry is a prime example of firms operating 
under limited liability. This is intensified when the liability is de jure limited to an even smaller 
amount. 
A kinked, or de facto convex, utility function may imply risk-loving behaviour if potential losses 
exceed the NPC’s liability. This is true for both risk-averse and risk-neutral NPCs. The de facto 
convexity of the NPC’s utility function (see Fig. 1) has two important implications for its behaviour, 
both of which will be discussed in terms of a risk-averse NPC (for the case of risk neutrality, see, for 
instance, Sinn, 2003). 
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2.1 The NPC takes excessive risk 
An NPC’s loss cannot exceed its equity capital. This may reduce its incentive to engage in measures 
that lower the probability of catastrophic accidents, which, by their nature, lead to costs that exceed 
the amount for which the NPC is liable. The socially inefficient excessive risk-taking resulting from 
private profit maximisation under limited liability is illustrated in Fig. 1 and explained in the 
following.1 
Two states of the world are possible, one in which ‘no accident’ occurs and a ‘catastrophic 
accident’-state. The abscissa shows the NPC’s actual wealth V determined by its equity capital while 
the ordinate depicts its corresponding utility u(V). If no accident occurs, the NPC’s wealth is given by 
V, whereas, in the case of an accident, the NPC is confronted with losses in the amount of L that 
reduces its wealth to V–L. If the losses exceed its initial equity, the NPC’s liability is (de facto) limited 
to its amount of equity. According to Shavell (1986), the NPC is in this case ‘judgment proof’. Thus, 
because of limited liability, the NPC’s utility function is horizontal for any negative amount of wealth 
as zero is the lower bound. 
Fig. 1: Limited liability and kinked utility, cf. Sinn (1983) 
 
To determine the NPC’s risk preference, let us consider its expected wealth E(V) and the 
corresponding safety equivalent S(V) given the two-point distribution of possible states of the world. If 
the potential loss L is sufficiently large, the utility function becomes effectively convex, which implies 
risk-loving behaviour in the sense that the safety equivalent of the NPC’s wealth distribution exceeds 
its expected wealth. The NPC then chooses a socially excessive risk level by taking into account that a 
share of the loss would not need to be borne by it but could be shifted to a third party. The social 
optimum would be achieved if the NPC were fully liable for any outcome and the full social costs of 
nuclear power thus internalised. Otherwise, a substantial misallocation of resources to nuclear power 
may result. 
                                                     
1 For an analysis of how liability rules and insurance affect incentives for risk-taking and the allocation of such risks, see 
Shavell (1982). In contrast to Sinn (1983) and Shavell (1986), who emphasise the role of limited liability on the 
individual’s risk-taking decision, Shavell (1982) evaluates two different kinds of liability rules – when liability is strict 
and when it is based on the negligence rule. Furthermore, it elaborates on the influence of these forms of liability and the 
presence of insurance markets on the incentives to engage in inefficient risk-taking. 
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Two schools of thought, both developed in the twentieth century, could be applied to the existence 
of a negative externality like the one described here. The first one, the Coasian solution (drawing from 
Coase, 1960), would argue that defining property rights and letting the involved parties negotiate 
potential outcomes would solve the problem at hand. The other one, the Pigouvian approach, calls for 
(stronger) government intervention in the form of setting a price on the activity generating the 
externality.  
Applying the former framework to the nuclear industry, one could interpret the limiting of liability 
as a Coasian solution. It gives NPCs the right to choose a risk level without being liable for all 
consequences. Thus, implicitly, the property rights for everything that becomes a loss after a 
catastrophic accident are given to the NPC; one could argue that negotiations between potential 
victims and the NPC could result in a Pareto-optimal level of risk-taking. However, this kind of 
negotiation is hardly practicable since nuclear risk is dispersed over very many individuals and any 
attempt to specify private contracts over an efficient risk level would suffer from the public good 
problem. Hence, society is not able to obtain a contractual relationship with the NPC, and the NPC 
could thus not be forced to pay for a potential damage ex ante, whereas ex post liability is limited to its 
equity capital. Therefore, Coasian irrelevance does not apply, and the risk allocation can be improved 
only if the government, representing the interest of society, implements a Pigouvian type of price 
mechanism on the activity that causes the externality. 
2.2 The NPC’s insurance-buying decision is downward biased 
As was explained with the help of Fig. 1, if the potential loss L is sufficiently large, the NPC’s safety 
equivalent S(V) exceeds its expected wealth E(V), and the subjective price of risk, the risk premium 
E(V)–S(V), becomes negative.2 As any insurer demands a premium at least equal to the expected 
indemnification payment, the NPC prefers to be underinsured, although it might in fact be risk-averse 
according to its preferences. Therefore, as a second implication of limited liability, the NPC’s 
motivation to purchase liability insurance diminishes3 because part of the costly insurance would 
protect the NPC against the losses it would not have to bear. 
3. Liability regulation of the nuclear power industry 
A major goal of nuclear liability regulation is to protect NPCs against potentially ruinous claims. By 
introducing a limit up to which they can be made liable, liability is passed from the NPC to a third 
party for any damage beyond this limit. In essence, this limitation recognised the social benefits of 
nuclear power and society’s tacit acceptance of nuclear risk while also increasing the profitability of 
the nuclear industry, thereby fostering its development.  
In what follows, we sketch the development of nuclear power liability regulation and its current 
state. We refer to Faure and Vanden Borre (2008) for an extensive analysis of international nuclear 
liability. 
The so-called Price-Anderson Act (cf. US NRC, 2012), passed in the United States in 1957, was 
the first comprehensive nuclear liability law and has been central to the issue of liability in nuclear 
accidents. It has repeatedly been renewed (with amendments), the last time in 2005 for another 20 
years; the defined amount of NPC liability has increased gradually over time. Today, coverage in the 
case of accident is provided by the nuclear industry itself on a two-tier basis. On the first layer, all 
                                                     
2 It shall be noted, therefore, that only the risk aversion of NPCs could justify the existence of nuclear insurance markets. 
3 Another possible reason for this result was given by Camerer and Kunreuther (1989), who argue that individuals’ 
decisions seem confused and perverse when they are confronted by very low frequency events, for example, catastrophic 
nuclear accidents. See also Kunreuther et al. (2001). 
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NPCs are strictly and individually liable, being required to purchase USD 375 million of liability 
coverage, provided by a private insurance pool. On the second layer, coverage is supplied by a mutual 
and solidary risk-sharing agreement among the NPCs. This risk-sharing pool is funded through 
retrospective payments in the case of a nuclear accident, which can reach up to USD 112 million per 
reactor. In total, this two-tier system provides an aggregate sum of USD 12 billion of liability capital. 
Beyond this amount, society implicitly acts as an insurer of last resort. 
Liability regulation of the nuclear industry outside the United States is based on two conventions, 
the Paris Convention (OECD, 1960) and the Vienna Convention (IAEA, 1963). The basic 
characteristics of the Paris Convention can be summarised as follows: (1) nuclear companies are 
strictly liable for any third-party damage; thus, their liability is irrespective of own fault;4 (2) liability 
is fully channelled to the NPCs; thus, only they can be sued; and (3) liability is limited to a pre-defined 
amount and a specified period of time within which claims can be made. More specifically, liability is 
limited to SDR 15 million;5 however, national legislation can provide for a higher, but necessarily 
limited, amount. Finally, (4) the liability has to be covered by mandatory insurance or some other 
financial security, to be held by the NPCs. 
In 1963, the Brussels Convention, supplementing the Paris Convention, established a three-tier 
system of nuclear accident liability: on the first layer, the NPCs are individually liable according to the 
Paris Convention. On the second tier, the state in which the nuclear accident occurs is liable for any 
damage up to SDR 70 million. Finally, on the third tier, all signatory states are jointly liable for 
claims, whereby each state is obliged to supply up to SDR 50 million. 
Parallel to the Paris and Brussels conventions, which mainly covered Western European countries, 
the IAEA’s Vienna Convention of 1963 introduced a regulatory framework signed by countries 
outside of Western Europe. It shares the basic principles of the Paris Convention, but the amount at 
which the NPCs can be made liable is more tightly limited.  
Following the 1986 nuclear accident at Chernobyl, efforts to establish a more comprehensive 
nuclear liability regime were undertaken. As a result, a Joint Protocol bringing together the Paris 
Convention and the Vienna Convention was adopted in 1988 and has since united the member states 
of the two conventions. In 1997, two new legal instruments aimed at increasing the liability of NPCs 
were adopted by the IAEA: the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention and, a new convention, the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation. The latter has also been signed (though not yet brought 
into force) by the United States, which had up to that point not been party to an international nuclear 
liability convention. In 2004, the contracting parties of the Paris Convention (and of the Brussels 
Convention) signed an amendment bringing the Paris Convention more in line with the amended 
Vienna Convention. The main objective of this amendment was to shift more liability to the nuclear 
industry. The 2004 amendment is supposed to remove the requirement to restrict the NPCs’ liability, 
allowing for de jure unlimited liability at the national level. However, this amendment has not yet 
been ratified by enough countries to take effect. 
The implementation of the international conventions varies substantially across nations. In 
Germany, for example, liability legislation far exceeds the requirements of the (amended) Paris 
Convention. It requires financial security in the amount of EUR 2.5 billion per power plant to be 
guaranteed by both a nuclear insurance pool and a risk-sharing agreement between the NPCs on the 
US model. In addition to financial security, the European Union provides EUR 300 million in 
accordance with the Brussels Convention in case of an accident. For any loss exceeding the aggregate 
amount, the NPCs’ liability is legally unlimited, thereby contradicting the basic principles of the Paris 
Convention. However, this definition of unlimited liability constitutes only a legal property that cannot 
                                                     
4 Cf. Shavell (1980) for a comprehensive analysis of the incentives strict liability and negligence rules have on risk-taking. 
5 A Special Drawing Right (SDR) is a unit defined by the International Monetary Fund. As of March 2012, the value of 
one SDR equals USD 0.66, EUR 0.423, JPY 12.1, and GBP 0.111. 
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actually be sustained, as liability is de facto limited to an NPC’s equity capital; society eventually 
takes over liability for nuclear damages exceeding the de facto liability limitation. This is also the case 
in Switzerland, where companies are de jure unlimitedly liable and are required to hold financial 
security in the amount of CHF 1 billion. In France, by contrast, the liability regulation of NPCs is 
weaker: the liability of the state-owned NPC6 is de jure limited to an amount of EUR 91 million per 
power plant (projected to increase to EUR 700 million according to the 2004 amendment), which must 
be insured. This is also the case in the Czech Republic, where the de jure liability limit of CZK 8 
billion necessitates insurance. 
As they are not party to any international conventions, China and Japan have a special position in 
global nuclear liability legislation. China passed an interim law on nuclear liability in 1986 that 
contains the basic properties of the international conventions. In 2007, NPCs’ liability limit was 
increased to RMB 300 million, above which the state is legally liable up to RMB 800 million. This 
legal regime is under revision, however. Along with its nuclear expansion, China aims to modify its 
nuclear energy law (see WNA, 2012a). In Japan, NPCs’ liability is strict, exclusive, and legally 
unlimited. Furthermore, a financial security in the amount of JPY 120 billion must be provided. In 
addition, Japan’s 1961 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (cf. NSC of Japan, 1961) allows for 
an NPC to be relieved of liability in claims resulting from ‘a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character’, the relevance of which came under discussion after the Fukushima catastrophe. That 
catastrophe has, however, regardless of this paragraph, provided evidence that the costs of a large-
scale nuclear accident can easily exceed the means of an NPC and that governments must eventually 
step in. In this context, the Japanese government decided to provide financial assistance for massive 
compensation payments and clean-up costs, for which it demands an annual fee. In this way, TEPCO 
is supposed to maintain adequate power supply and ensure the safety of its plants. According to 
government estimates, TEPCO will be able to complete its repayments in 10 to 13 years, after which it 
is supposed to revert to being a fully private company with no government involvement (cf. WNA, 
2012b). 
The main insight gleaned from studying nuclear liability regulation around the world is that the 
liability for losses from catastrophic accidents is either de facto limited by the NPCs’ equity capital (as 
in Germany, Switzerland, and Japan) or de jure limited by national legislation (as in all other nuclear 
countries). Thus, some countries have chosen to limit NPCs’ liability explicitly while, in other 
countries, firms by their nature are liable, at most, with their equity capital. In both cases, the 
consequences of limited liability, as discussed in Section 2, become relevant. Taking this as a cue, the 
following section critically discusses the regulatory instruments that could be applied by a regulatory 
authority. 
4. Evaluating regulatory instruments 
In Section 2, we explained the possibly severe implications of limited liability for NPCs’ risk-taking 
decisions. Section 3 has shown that current liability regulation does not sufficiently address these 
problems and that, therefore, nuclear risk might not be properly taken care of. This section reviews 
various regulatory approaches and evaluates their ability to reduce the NPCs’ incentives to take 
excessive risks. 
4.1 Safety regulation 
Aside from the question of liability regulation, another string of literature proposes setting safety 
standards. Public intervention to directly regulate the extent of precautionary measures includes the 
                                                     
6 As of March 2012, the French state holds 84.8 per cent of the shares of Électricité de France (EdF), the owner of all 
French nuclear power plants. 
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definition of a full set of measures leading to the optimal level of precaution, thereby avoiding the 
problem of excessive risk-taking. 
The usual criticism that (central) regulatory authorities face is that they possess imperfect 
information and are therefore unable to define safety regulation properly (see, for instance, Baumol 
and Oates, 1971; Shavell, 1984). This may hold even more strongly for the regulation of nuclear 
power, which is by nature very complex. This problem of complexity and its implications for 
regulation are discussed by Trebilcock and Winter (1997) and comprehensively analysed in the 
context of several countries by Bredimas and Nuttall (2008).  
Nuclear safety regulation concerns the initial construction of a power plant but also comprises the 
continual monitoring and reassessments of precautionary measures. Among others, Faure and Skogh 
(1990) point out that obtaining necessary information is difficult for a regulator, who might eventually 
depend on information provided by the nuclear industry itself. Since the industry acts in its own 
interest, it may provide inaccurate signals; regulation may then become too lax in some respects and 
too strict in others. 
In general, safety and liability regulation have been considered substitutes for correcting 
externalities; consequentially, the usual policy recommendation has been to choose the instrument that 
causes the least administrative cost for achieving a given goal (see, for example, Calabresi, 1970, for 
an early discussion of related issues). In practice, however, both instruments are often used jointly, in 
nuclear power regulation, for example. Building upon this observation, Shavell (1984) and Kolstad et 
al. (1990) find that safety regulation and liability rules may complement each other, as their joint use 
can correct the inefficiencies of using either of the two alone. 
Whereas a complementary use of direct safety regulation could reduce the problems associated 
with limited liability, one cannot assume – owing to the underlying complexity – that it can solve the 
problem. In addition, command-and-control measures are often accused of creating enormous 
inefficiencies, up to the point that some scholars, such as Coase (1960), argue that direct regulation 
might not necessarily provide better results than leaving the problem to the market. 
4.2 Minimum equity capital requirements 
Defining minimum equity requirements (in equity-to-assets ratio terms) is an instrument commonly 
used to regulate the problem of limited liability in the banking sector (cf. Sinn, 2003). Although the 
causes and consequences in the banking sector appear to be very similar, there is one crucial 
difference in the nuclear industry: whereas a bank’s maximum third-party loss, even under the 
assumption of perfectly correlated risks, is at maximum defined by the bank’s liabilities (stated in the 
balance sheet), the potentially catastrophic damages of a large-scale nuclear accident are not 
represented on an NPC’s balance sheet. Thus, even the requirement to finance all assets with 100 per 
cent liable equity capital would not fully internalise excessive nuclear risk-taking. Hence, we conclude 
that it could lower the extent of the negative externality, since the NPCs’ de facto liability capital 
would increase, but that it would not be as effective as in the banking industry. 
4.3 Mandatory insurance 
The existence of limited liability diminishes the NPC’s incentive to purchase liability insurance for 
potential large-scale accidents (see Section 2). As a solution for this, and to reduce the incentives for 
excessive risk-taking, Trebilcock and Winter (1997) suggest mandatory liability insurance. Requiring 
the entire potential nuclear damage to be insured, thereby transferring the risk from the NPC to a third 
party, could induce an efficient outcome, as the NPC would have to pay a premium at least equal to 
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the expected loss.7 In this way, the NPC would be charged by the insurer for excessive risk-taking, 
which would become costly, and the negative externality would vanish.  
However, imposing a full mandatory insurance for potential nuclear accidents has several 
shortcomings. First of all, there is the well-known problem of insurance-induced moral hazard, as the 
insurance market is likely not able to obtain as much information about care and risks as the NPC has.8 
Moreover, the insurability of catastrophic events – characterised by a low occurrence frequency but 
highly severe impacts – has generally been questioned by the literature.9 As a prime example, nuclear 
risk has been repeatedly regarded as non-actuarial (see, for example, Litzenberger et al., 1996; 
Kunreuther, 1997; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1999; Radetzki and Radetzki, 2000).10 
The most important reason why mandatory insurance might not be a reasonable alternative, 
however, is that the capital resources available to the insurance industry might well be insufficient to 
cover the damages of nuclear catastrophes. As insurance companies are also judgment-proof, they 
might not have the incentives to calculate and charge actuarially correct premiums (even if this were 
possible) but would also maximise their profits taking into account their own limited liability. In this 
case, the insurance premiums charged upon the nuclear industry would not reflect the true expected 
damages. Consequently, some of limited liability’s effect on risk-taking would shift from one industry 
to another, without solving the core problem (see Buck and Jus, 2009, for a similar argument 
concerning the banking industry). 
4.4 Mutual risk-sharing pools 
In contrast to insurance, where risk is transferred to a third party, the risk in a mutual risk-sharing pool 
is shared among the parties creating the risk. Here, the NPCs agree on an ex post sharing of the costs 
of a catastrophic accident. Whereas insurance presumes an ex ante pricing of nuclear risk, mutual risk-
sharing has an advantage: just paying the actual costs eliminates the need to estimate potential 
damages and probabilities in advance. The advantages of mutual risk-sharing over insurance have 
been extensively discussed and emphasised by, among others, Skogh (1999), Faure (2004), Faure and 
Fiore (2008), and Skogh (2008), who elaborates on the theoretical foundation of mutual risk-sharing. 
Skogh (1999) describes mutual risk-sharing as beneficial since it does not require the assignment of 
subjective probabilities of accidents and explains why it is advisable for parties facing similar risks to 
share these in common pools. Faure (2004) investigates whether an extended mutual agreement 
between NPCs could serve as an alternative to the nuclear power liability regulation in place today. 
Faure and Fiore (2008) discuss possible structures and the potential for a more comprehensive mutual 
risk-sharing agreement among Europe’s NPCs. 
An example of a mutual risk-sharing agreement for NPCs comprises part of the US Price-Anderson 
Act. The US nuclear insurance market is supplemented by two mutual risk-sharing agreements (often 
referred to as ‘mutuals’): the Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL), created by NPCs in 1980, 
and the Overseas NEIL (ONEIL), established in 1999 in partnership with European NPCs. In Europe, 
NPCs have created mutual insurance schemes as a reaction to the amended nuclear liability regulation 
to jointly ensure a higher availability of liability capital. The first was the European Mutual 
Association for the Nuclear Industry (EMANI), founded in 1978; the second mutual, the European 
                                                     
7 The idea to require the purchase of liability insurance to correct for certain inefficiencies is widespread; consider, for 
example, automobile or professional liability insurance. 
8 For comprehensive analyses, see, for instance, Pauly (1974) and Shavell (1982). 
9 This is the case for both natural and man-made catastrophes, to different extents. See, among others, Kunreuther (1997) 
and Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999). 
10 One may also refer to Section 2 for a discussion of inefficiencies on the insurance demand side. Limited liability and the 
low-probability characteristic of nuclear accidents lead to a biased individual insurance decision. 
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Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Industry (ELINI), was created in 2002. At the national level, NPCs 
in Germany guarantee mutual support in case of an accident up to EUR 2.35 billion. 
In general, mutual risk-sharing creates a collective responsibility for risk-taking. Making 
companies liable generates incentives to prevent accidents, which implies a reduction of excessive 
risk-taking to decrease costs. However, risk-sharing pools suffer from the fundamental problem of 
collective action: the higher the number of NPCs financing the pool, the stronger the tendency towards 
free-riding, as individual responsibility shrinks and peer-monitoring becomes more costly. Demanding 
a fixed size risk-sharing pool to which each NPC must contribute according to certain indicators (the 
number of power plants, for example) increases the capital that the NPC loses in an accident. At the 
same time, however, the effectiveness of this kind of regulation diminishes as an NPC’s share of the 
pool declines or if the opacity is so high that individual action is not easily observable. 
4.5 Catastrophe bonds 
Catastrophe (cat) bonds represent one way to spread the risk of potentially large losses via financial 
instruments (i.e. capital markets). A cat bond offers investors a return above the risk-free rate when a 
specified catastrophic event does not occur but requires the sacrifice of interest or principal otherwise. 
The general idea of cat bonds is explained by Cummins and Weiss (2009), who also give an overview 
of the relevant literature (for analyses of other alternative, and private, arrangements for transferring 
risk, see Wagner, 1998; Radetzki and Radetzki, 2000). So far, cat bonds have generally been used by 
insurers as an alternative to traditional re-insurance or by re-insurers, usually to atomise the risk of 
natural catastrophes such as earthquakes or hurricanes (see Evans, 2011; for a comparison between cat 
bonds and re-insurance, see Gibson et al., 2007; Cummins, 2012). Mexico was the first sovereign to 
offer cat bonds, thereby protecting itself against the risk of natural catastrophes (see, for example, 
Cardenas et al., 2007; Michel-Kerjan et al., 2011). An overview of the development and current state 
of cat bond markets can be found in Cummins (2012) and Swiss Re (2012). It can be clearly seen that 
issuance volumes declined sharply in 2008 owing to the financial crisis and have still not fully 
recovered. In 2011, they reached a volume of USD 5 billion. 
The idea to employ cat bonds for not only natural catastrophes but also large-scale nuclear 
accidents is discussed by Tyran and Zweifel (1993). They give an elaborate description of how to 
internalise environmental risks such as potential nuclear catastrophes via capital markets. More 
specifically, they observe that NPCs could emit cat bonds by which nuclear risk is spread among a 
large number of investors. The principal received for each cat bond issued is supposed to be placed in 
risk-free assets, for example, in certain treasury bonds. The spread between the cat bond interest and 
the interest on a risk-free bond represents the market assessment of the risk of a nuclear accident, if 
this is specified as the trigger for the cat bonds’ default. Hence, as nuclear risk is priced by the capital 
markets, risk-taking becomes costly for the NPCs, incentivising them to reconsider their risk-taking 
decision. Consequently, NPCs taking excessive risk may either revise their strategy to reduce the 
premiums to be paid on cat bonds or even leave the market if this business is too costly for them after 
the risk is priced. Radetzki and Radetzki (2000) give an overview of the alternatives that use capital 
markets to cover nuclear damages. 
Leaving the well-known problems of cat bonds (such as high transactions costs) aside, the main 
issue in the case of nuclear power is that NPCs would not voluntarily emit cat bonds. Paying a 
premium on cat bonds would imply additional costs and undermine the benefits of limited liability. 
Thus, the regulatory authority would need to stipulate the emission of a certain volume of cat bonds, 
hoping that a market for them emerges, which could be, in principle, only a matter of the price of the 
cat bonds. 
Arguments can be advanced, however, that cat bonds as they are currently employed can hardly 
solve the problem of limited liability entirely. Stipulating full coverage for the potential losses of each 
nuclear power plant operating worldwide would result in unimaginable amounts. Given the currently 
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estimated damages of the Fukushima accident, the regulatory authority could demand a cat bonds 
emission of USD 200 billion. This would certainly outbalance any reasonable scope of this market 
given that there are more than 400 nuclear power plants operating worldwide and that in excess of 
USD 80 trillion would need to be invested in cat bonds. Therefore, although the idea of cat bonds 
sounds very promising, the nature of their implementation would need to be debated. The next section 
offers a proposal that partly relies on cat bonds but could potentially overcome the above-stated 
problem. 
5. A market-based (rolling) nuclear risk fee 
After having pointed out that current liability regulation might imply severe incentives for excessive 
risk-taking and having reviewed various regulatory instruments, we now propose a new way for 
liability in the nuclear industry to be regulated. The aim is to internalise the externality of excessive 
risk-taking, which we think is best accomplished by combining the strength of private markets with 
Pigouvian-type public intervention. We propose to use the ability of capital markets to evaluate risk-
taking and society’s reserve capacity to absorb high risks in order to achieve the desired level of 
nuclear power plant safety. 
Our basic idea can be summarised as a two-stage approach in which, in the first stage, capital 
markets, by pricing a specified volume of cat bonds, provide an assessment of the risk stemming from 
each power plant. In the second stage, the regulatory authority employs this observable risk 
assessment and intervenes by charging a Pigouvian fee equal to an actuarially fair premium, thereby 
inducing the socially optimal level of risk-taking. Eventually, society adopts the role of an explicit 
insurer for nuclear risk. We sketch the main arguments in favour of this solution below before 
discussing the details relevant to its implementation. 
Our analysis has pointed out several issues leading us to the conclusion that neither public safety 
regulation nor private participation alone would solve the problem of excessive nuclear risk-taking. In 
contrast to Tyran and Zweifel (1993), our approach does not aim to establish full loss coverage on 
capital markets. Instead, our idea uses cat bond markets for risk assessment only and delegates any 
further responsibility to the regulator (i.e. society). Specifically, our proposal demands that NPCs be 
obliged to issue cat bonds for each power plant in a volume that represents a (small) fraction of the 
potential costs of a large-scale accident. One could estimate an amount of about USD 100 million, 
which has already proven to be absorbable by capital markets, while assessing the probability of 
default by the spread over a risk-free interest rate (for example, LIBOR). This has two advantages: (1) 
it overcomes potential liquidity/capacity problems in capital markets, thus isolating the actual risk 
from those of other capital market deficiencies, and, (2) as the cat bond issuance is plant-specific, the 
risk assessment is transparent and the risks of various power plants become comparable. Moreover, 
even if the cat bonds amount to only a fraction of the potential cost, each single bond has a ‘default’ 
probability independent of the total number of bonds issued. Hence, the interest premium to be paid on 
the cat bonds by the NPC for a specific power plant reflects the true risk of a large-scale accident, in a 
case where the trigger of the cat bond would be pulled and the NPC would default on the cat bonds. 
The ability of capital markets to rate assets has been stressed by Fama (1991). Moreover, it is 
generally believed that investors are likely to perform better at assessing risk than regulators, who are 
not investing own capital and therefore may lack the incentive to obtain costly information. 
Furthermore, it is argued by Cummins and Weiss (2009) that securities markets are more efficient at 
reducing information asymmetries and facilitating price formation than insurance markets. 
Having outlined the first stage of our proposal, we will now explain what the regulatory authority 
should do in the second stage. We emphasise again that a Coasian solution to the problem is not 
feasible and that the regulator must intervene in a Pigouvian way (see Section 2). Observing the plant-
specific interest premium of a cat bond over a risk-free bond, the regulator defines a fee for each 
nuclear power plant to be paid by the NPC. The fee is proportional to the interest premium, hence 
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lower for safer plants and higher for those assessed to pose a higher risk. In this way, the regulator, 
representing society, becomes the insurer for the nuclear risk by charging a premium that depends on 
actual risk and in return agrees to absorb the costs of large-scale accidents. This proposal overcomes 
the negative consequences of limited liability, as the true risk becomes the crucial factor in the fee an 
NPC has to pay. Society, on the other hand, has the capacity to absorb the costs of nuclear accidents – 
a better capacity, in any case, than any privately owned company (like an insurance company). 
Societies have always managed to overcome severe catastrophes and will also look for the best 
possible way to deal with a nuclear accident 
The advantage of the outlined proposal is that nuclear power companies are internalising the entire 
social costs of their activity, and society is, on average, fairly compensated for the risk it is taking 
over. This is all that can be demanded from an economic perspective, and it remains up to the NPCs to 
decide whether it is still profitable to run nuclear power plants. Of course, this decision would also be 
influenced by developments in electricity prices, which could rise if an unsafe nuclear power plant had 
to close, thereby making safer ones sufficiently profitable even though the fee would have to be paid. 
By the same token, renewable energy sources would also profit, as running nuclear power plants 
would become more costly owing to this proposal. 
Finally, we will discuss more details of our approach. Its functional design is summarised in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2: A market-based (rolling) nuclear risk fee 
 
Based on the observed risk premium, the regulator computes the Pigouvian nuclear risk fee, which 
equals the expected nuclear damage as the result of multiplying the probability of a large-scale 
accident (extracted from the interest spread between the cat bond and a risk-free bond), with its pre-
defined potential costs less the volume of cat bonds that has been emitted.11 Moreover, to give NPCs 
the opportunity to improve their assessment and thus reduce the Pigouvian fee that is to be paid, cat 
bond issuance and the determination of the fee could be repeated according to a pre-defined schedule, 
every two or three years, for instance. The maturity of the bonds could also be defined according to 
this schedule. 
Finally, two further aspects shall be considered. First, compared to the general design of cat bonds, 
the question of how to specify the default – how the investor’s impairment is triggered – will be 
discussed. Finken and Laux (2009) give an overview of the possibilities and discuss their benefits and 
weaknesses. One alternative would be to link the default trigger to the intensity of a nuclear accident 
as rated, for example, by the IAEA, according to the International Nuclear Event Scale. Second, 
existing rating agencies and new, more specialised agencies could rate the risk of nuclear power plants 
and provide this information to potential investors, as done for other financial products. 
                                                     
11 The potential costs can be plant-specific, depending on proximity to cities or production methods, for instance. 
Specifying the potential costs of a nuclear accident is a topic for future research. 
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6. Conclusions 
Currently, NPCs enjoy limited liability with respect to potential catastrophic nuclear accidents. This 
has been seen as necessary to protect NPCs from ruinous claims and was essential for the development 
of this industry, but it may nowadays be re-interpreted as a major source of excessively risky nuclear 
power plants. As the number of nuclear power plants worldwide is expected to rise over the next 
decades, it is all the more important to discuss ways in which the use of nuclear power can be made 
safer. Therefore, we have evaluated several known instruments and pointed out that all have 
weaknesses or are simply not able to reduce excessive risk-taking. We have thus proposed a new 
regulatory approach, based on the general idea of catastrophe bonds, that may be superior to the other 
instruments. The core of our proposal consists of a two-stage procedure: In the first stage, capital 
markets evaluate the risk stemming from each power plant via catastrophe bonds issued on a smaller 
scale than actually required to cover the potential losses but whose value can be used as an indicator 
for the riskiness of a nuclear power plant. In the second stage, the regulator uses this private risk 
assessment and intervenes by charging an actuarially fair premium that induces the optimal level of 
risk-taking. Society then acts as an explicit insurer for nuclear risk and is, on average, fairly 
compensated for the risk it is taking over. The implementation of such a scheme would make the use 
of nuclear power (privately) more expensive, since the risk of accidents would now also be priced. 
Consequently, some nuclear power plants (in particular the unsafe ones) may become unprofitable and 
could disappear from the market. The other ones that remain privately profitable are then also socially 
profitable according to the monetary risk they are imposing on society. Neither the ethical nor the 
moral arguments against nuclear power have been considered at this stage; even after the optimal level 
of risk-taking is implemented, society may decide not to use nuclear power. This decision must not be 
taken on the basis of nuclear power plants that are too risky, however, but given that the level of care 
is chosen optimally. Therefore, solving the problem of limited liability and excessive risk-taking is 
both an important element of the future use of nuclear power and a necessary basis for decisions 
regarding nuclear phase-outs. 
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